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Abstract
Background: Over the past decade, there has been sustained interest and efforts to develop a S. aureus vaccine.
There is a need to better evaluate the potential public health impact of S. aureus vaccination, particularly given that
preventative measures exist to reduce infection. To our knowledge, there is no previous work to assess the potential of
a S. aureus vaccine to yield additional MRSA infection reduction in a hospital setting, on top of other preventative
measures that already proved efficient.
Methods: The main objectives were to propose a versatile simulation framework for assessing potential added benefits
of a hypothetical S. Aureus vaccine in conjunction with other preventative measures, and to illustrate possibilities in a
given hospital setting. To this end, we employed a recently published dynamic transmission modelling framework that
we further adapted and expanded to include a hypothetical S. aureus vaccination component in order to estimate
potential benefits of vaccinating patients prior to hospital admission.
Results: Model-based projections indicate that even with other hygiene prevention measures in place, vaccination of
patients prior to hospital admission has the potential to provide additional reduction of MRSA infection. Vaccine coverage
and vaccine efficacy are key factors that would ultimately impact the magnitude of this reduction. For example, in an
average case scenario with 50% decolonization, 50% screening and 50% hygiene compliance level in place, S. aureus
vaccination with 25% vaccine coverage, 75% vaccine efficacy against infection, and 0% vaccine efficacy against
colonization, may lead to 12% model-projected additional reduction in MRSA infection prevalence due to vaccination,
while this reduction could reach 37% for vaccination with 75% vaccine coverage and 75% vaccine efficacy against
infection in the same average case scenario.
Conclusions: S. aureus vaccination could potentially provide additional reduction of MRSA infection in a hospital setting,
on top of reductions from hygiene prevention measures. The magnitude of such additional reductions can vary
significantly depending on the level of hygiene prevention measures in place, as well as key vaccine factors such as
coverage and efficacy. Identifying appropriate combinations of preventative measures may lead to optimal strategies to
effectively reduce MRSA infection in hospitals.
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Background
Staphylococcus aureus (S. aureus) is an important oppor-
tunistic pathogen and the aetiological agent of a wide
range of infections, from mild skin and soft tissue infec-
tions to bactaeremia complicated by endocarditis, pneumo-
nia, metastatic infections, sepsis or toxic shock syndrome
[1]. S. aureus is an ubiquitous pathogen, part of the human
microbiological flora. It persistently and asymptomatically
colonizes up to 20-30% of humans and intermittently
colonizes 50-60% [1].
Following the introduction of methicillin in 1959, various
methicillin-resistant S. aureus (MRSA) clones (resistant to
all currently available β-lactam antibiotics) emerged and
spread worldwide [2]. Since the 1960s, when the first
outbreak of healthcare-associated MRSA (HA-MRSA) was
reported [3], HA-MRSA clones have been recognized as a
leading cause of nosocomial infections in the United States
and around the world [4,5]. A worldwide increase in the
number of infections, together with the emergence of
community-associated MRSA (CA-MRSA) in the late
1990s and its expansion into hospital settings [6], has
increased the burden of MRSA infections [1]. Prevention
of MRSA infections has become a goal for public health
agencies and policy makers [7-9].
Several studies, the majority of which were conducted in
individual or small groups of facilities, have recently shown
that the rates of MRSA infections decreased following im-
plementation of MRSA prevention strategies [10-15]. A
number of studies have assessed the impact of using a
combination of different prevention strategies (‘bundle’
measures), including universal surveillance for MRSA,
contact precautions, hand hygiene and institutional culture
change programs [11,12,15-18]. For example, a cluster-
randomized trial evaluating the effect of active surveillance
and expanded use of barrier precautions for MRSA and
vancomycin-resistant Enterococcus (VRE) compared to
‘existing procedures’ during a 6-month intervention period,
did not find that the intervention was more effective than
existing practice in reducing the incidence of colonization
or infection with MRSA or VRE [16]. However many
studies have shown a positive effect of implementing the
bundle measures in endemic settings [11,12,15,17,18]. An
observational study on the effect of MRSA bundle mea-
sures, implemented in 2007 in Veterans Affairs hospitals
throughout the United States, reported 62% and 45% de-
creases in rates of HA-MRSA infections in ICUs (Intensive
Care Units) and non-ICUs following a 3-year intervention
period [18].
Although the bulk of the evidence suggests that bundle
measures are efficient towards reducing the incidence of
MRSA nosocomial infections, the mortality, morbidity
and costs associated with these infections remain high.
S. aureus infections are the leading cause of hospitalization
for surgical drainage of pus in children, of bacteremia in
persons aged >65 years, and of prosthetic device and intra-
vascular line infection [19]. In this context, during the last
decade there has been a sustained interest and effort
[19-22] to develop an effective vaccine against S. aureus
[19], and several vaccine candidates are in early stage de-
velopment [22].
Given the many challenges of developing a S. aureus
vaccine [22], a natural timely question arises regarding its
potential added value to positively impact the burden of
MRSA infection at the hospital level. To address this
question, we employ here a versatile dynamic transmission
modelling framework complementary to, and expanding
that used in D’Agata et al. [23], with the aim of assessing
and quantifying the potential impact of a S. aureus vaccine
in conjunction with hygiene prevention measures on
reducing MRSA infection in a hospital setting. The main
objectives were to both propose an adequate simulation
framework for assessing potential added benefits of a
hypothetical S. aureus vaccine in conjunction with other
preventative measures and illustrate the spectrum of
possibilities with a few relevant scenarios in a given
hospital setting. The analyses we present here were not
intended to be exhaustive, but rather to serve as an
illustrative starting point.
Methods
To our knowledge, this study is the first to evaluate if and
how S. aureus vaccination prior to hospital admission may
further reduce MRSA infection in a given hospital setting;
particularly since hygiene prevention measures can be
quite effective.
Mathematical modelling overview
For our first attempt to estimate potential benefits of
vaccinating patients prior to hospital admission, we chose
to start by employing a recently published dynamic trans-
mission modelling framework [23,24], which we further
adapted and expanded to meet our specific objectives.
One of the main rationales for building a vaccination
component on top of an existing published model [23,24]
was that baseline estimates for all the model parameters
were provided for a given hospital setting in the US. In
line with the previously published work [23,24], the
present framework is based on a dynamic transmission
model for MRSA only, further split into HA-MRSA and
CA-MRSA. Methicillin sensitive S. aureus (MSSA) is not
included. The original base model structure, which expli-
citly accounts for HA-MRSA and CA-MRSA, with differ-
ent corresponding baseline model parameters (Table 1),
was preserved as actual and appropriate to account for the
realities of MRSA transmission in a hospital setting in the
US. The explicit inclusion of HA-MRSA and CA-MRSA
is adequate here as CA-MRSA is a growing problem in
US hospitals, with CA-MRSA strains genetically distinct
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from HA-MRSA strains and thought to have evolved
separately [25]. Such features allow for potential differen-
tial transmission aspects to be taken into consideration,
thus enabling more realistic estimations of the overall
reduction of MRSA infection in hospital settings following
implementation of different interventions. The proposed
modelling framework also readily enables consideration of
potentially different values for vaccine-related parameters
for HA-MRSA strains versus CA-MRSA strains, which
may be an important aspect for future vaccine evaluations,
in light of underlying genotypic differences.
In the analyses presented here, for the time being we
have considered identical vaccine-related parameters for
both HA-MRSA and CA-MRSA so as to reduce the
number of possible combinations of parameters.
The model’s setting is a large tertiary hospital in the US,
with a fixed capacity of 400 beds, and approximately
25000 admissions per year [23]. For simplicity and
consistency, and in the absence of hospital occupancy data
over time, we assumed that the hospital is fully occupied
at all times, throughout our simulations. We consequently
varied the daily number of admissions (typically 60–80
patients/day in our simulations) to ensure full hospital
capacity. In this simplified framework, we hypothesized that
patients are adequately vaccinated with a S. aureus vaccine
before hospital admission (e.g. planned hospitalization, vac-
cination of high-risk individuals), in an optimal timeframe
(e.g., few weeks) to yield a protective immune response for
the duration of the hospital stay. Similar to the baseline
case from the original paper [23], we assumed a constant
in-flow of colonized patients into the hospital correspond-
ing to 10% (fixed) of the daily admission numbers.
Model structure
The detailed model structure including a hypothetical S.
aureus vaccination component is shown in Figure 1,
resulting in a highly versatile modelling framework, with
enhanced options for conducting differential analyses. We
employ a dynamic transmission model with two compo-
nents, “Unvaccinated” and “Vaccinated”, respectively. Each
Table 1 Model parameters, with baseline values imported from [23,24]
Parameter Symbol Baseline value
Total no. of patients N 400
Fraction of patients colonized with CA-MRSA upon admission λbaselineCC 0.03
Fraction of patients colonized with HA-MRSA upon admission λbaselineCH 0.07
Fraction of patients infected with CA-MRSA upon admission λbaselineIC 0.005
Fraction of patients infected with HA-MRSA upon admission λbaselineIH 0.0017
Average length of stay susceptible patients 1/γS 5 days
Average length of stay patients colonized with CA-MRSA 1/γCC 5 days
Average length of stay patients colonized with HA-MRSA 1/γCH 7 days
Average length of stay patients infected with CA-MRSA 1/γIC 10 days
Average length of stay patients infected with HA-MRSA 1/γIH 18 days
CA-MRSA colonized-to-susceptible patient effective transmission rate βbaselineCC 0.36 day
−1
HA-MRSA colonized-to-susceptible patient effective transmission rate βbaselineCH 0.27 day
−1
CA-MRSA infected-to-susceptible patient effective transmission rate βbaselineIC 0.09 day
−1
HA-MRSA infected-to-susceptible patient effective transmission rate βbaselineIH 0.07 day
−1
Infection rate in CA-MRSA colonized patients φC 0.1 γCC
(10% per day of hospital stay)
Infection rate in HA-MRSA colonized patients φH 0.1 γCH
(10% per day of hospital stay)
Death rate of CA-MRSA infected patients δC 0.033 γIC
(3.3% per day of hospital stay)
Death rate of HA-MRSA infected patients δH 0.2 γIH
(20% per day of hospital stay)
Cure rate of CA-MRSA infected patients τC 0.967 γIC
(96.7% per day of hospital stay)
Cure rate of HA-MRSA infected patients τH 0.8 γIH
(80% per day of hospital stay)
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component contains five distinctive states: susceptible (S)
patients, patients colonized with HA-MRSA (CH pa-
tients), patients colonized with CA-MRSA (CC patients),
patients infected with HA-MRSA (IH patients) or infected
with CA-MRSA (IC patients). The additional “V” notation
here is used for the corresponding vaccinated states.
Patients are vaccinated (V) before being hospitalized and
enter directly into the “vaccinated” compartment.
In Figure 1, the arrows indicate the inflows and outflows
for each of the five states in the two model components,
with their corresponding rates. The rate of hospital admis-
sions is Λ, with corresponding fractions of patients admit-
ted with CA-MRSA colonization, CA-MRSA infection,
HA-MRSA colonization, and HA-MRSA infection
denoted by λCC(V), λIC(V), λCH(V), and λIH(V), respectively
(unvaccinated/vaccinated). λSV represents the fraction of
susceptible patients who received the vaccine prior to
hospital admission. The mean length of hospital stay is
defined as 1/γS, 1/γC, and 1/γH, for susceptible patients,
patients colonized with CA-MRSA, and patients colonized
with HA-MRSA, respectively.
For both the “Unvaccinated” and “Vaccinated” compart-
ments here, the forces of infection (e.g., the per susceptible
risk of infection) for HA-MRSA (FH) and CA-MRSA (FC),
respectively, are governed by the following expressions:
FH¼βCH CHþCHVð Þ=NþβIH IHþIHVð Þ=N
FC¼βCC CCþCCVð Þ=NþβIC ICþICVð Þ=N
Here, βCC, βIC, βCH, and βIH denote the effective trans-
mission rates to susceptible patients from patients with
CA-MRSA colonization, CA-MRSA infection, HA-MRSA
colonization, or HA-MRSA infection, respectively. CC(V),
IC(V), CH(V), and IH(V) denote the number of patients
Figure 1 Structure of dynamic transmission model with vaccination for MRSA infection in a hospital setting. This model structure is
following the model structure in [23]. Related parameter definitions and mathematical details can be found in Tables 1 and 2. This is a basic
framework focused solely on transmission and infection at patient population level in a hospital setting, and not aiming to model dynamic
feedback between hospital and community, patient history (pre- or post-hospitalization), etc. Patients are flowing into the hospital at a rate Λ
defined as number of patients admitted per time unit (e.g., number of admissions per day), with corresponding fractions denoted by λ flowing in
each of the Susceptible/Colonized (CA-MRSA/HA-MRSA)/Infected (CA-MRSA/HA-MRSA) states, unvaccinated and vaccinated, respectively, upon
admission. We assume that vaccination takes place adequately prior to hospital admission, so that patients can mount a protective immune
response; we do not consider in-hospital vaccination of current patients, under the assumption that the duration of the hospital stay is likely too
short to enable a significant vaccine-induced immune response. We also do not consider vaccine protection waning for vaccinated patients while
in the hospital, assuming the vaccine effects last at least for the duration of the current hospital stay. ¥ “*” indicates additional potential benefits
of vaccination that can be considered in this type of modelling framework: (1) potential faster clearance in the vaccinated patients; (2) potential
faster recovery from infection in the vaccinated patients (milder infections); (3) lower death rates in the infected vaccinated patients (milder
infections). In the analyses performed here, we did not consider such enhanced vaccination effects, and all the related parameters are similar in
the Unvaccinated and Vaccinated model components. The possibility of a vaccine impacting colonization [26-30] is taken into account as a
potential reduction in the force of infection.
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with CA-MRSA colonization, CA-MRSA infection, HA-
MRSA colonization, or HA-MRSA infection, unvaccinated
and vaccinated, respectively N denotes the total hospital
patient population. Transmission within the hospital can
occur as a result of direct contact with patients or contami-
nated fomites and Health Care Workers (HCW).
In this context, the HA- and CA-MRSA colonization
rates of susceptible unvaccinated (S) patients are given
by: (1-η)FH and (1-η)FC, respectively, where η denotes
the hospital hygiene compliance level. For vaccinated
susceptible (SV) patients, we can also include the poten-
tial for vaccine efficacy against carriage acquisition, νCC
and νCH - and thus the corresponding colonization terms
can be amended as follows (1-νCH)(1-η)FH and (1-νCC)
(1-η)FC, respectively.
The infection rates in colonized patients with CA-
MRSA and patients with HA-MRSA are φC and φH,
respectively. For the vaccinated population, we consider
the vaccine efficacy against infection (νIC and νIH) by
introducing reduction factors in the corresponding infec-
tion rates as (1- νIH) φH and (1- νIC) φC, respectively.
As a starting point, we considered similar vaccine effi-
cacy against carriage or infection for both CA-MRSA
and HA-MRSA, i.e. νCC = νCH = νC and νIC = νIH = νI.
The cure rates of patients with CA-MRSA infection
and HA-MRSA infection are τC and τH, while the death
rates of these patients are δC and δH, respectively. The
decolonization rates of patients with CA-MRSA coloni
zation and HA-MRSA colonization are αC and αH,
respectively. The mathematical model formulation is
standard for mechanistic deterministic compartmental
models of disease spread in mathematical epidemiology,
based on the law of mass action and resulting in a char-
acteristic set of non-linear ordinary differential equations
[31] For each of the ten distinctive model states illus-
trated by the different compartments in Figure 1, the
rate of change over time equals the specific inflow minus
the corresponding outflow, characterized by the rates
indicated on the corresponding arrows in the model
schematic in Figure 1, with related definitions and math-
ematical details given in Tables 1 and 2. The total hos-
pital patient population N here is maintained constant at
full hospital occupancy (N = 400 patients) by varying the
hospital admission rate Λ so that the total mass balance
is properly closed.
Model parameters
In this analysis, we are interested in outcomes while
varying the following input parameters outlined in
Table 2:
1. Hospital hygiene compliance with measures aimed
at reducing MRSA transmission (e.g. hand hygiene,
wearing gloves), governed by the hygiene
compliance model parameter η. Compliance level
may vary between zero (corresponding to 0%
compliance, η = 0) and one (corresponding to 100%
compliance, η = 1).
2. Hospital adherence and compliance to patients’
screening and isolation for MRSA colonization:
finding the carriers and placing them on contact
precautions within the hospital, governed by the
screening efficacy model parameter s. It may vary
between 0% (s = 0): no MRSA carrier is placed on
contact precaution and 100% (s = 1): all MRSA
carriers are placed on the same contact precautions
as the MRSA-infected patients.
3. Hospital decolonization of colonized patients:
identifying the carriers and applying decolonization
regimens within the hospital, governed by the
decolonization efficacy model parameter d. It may
vary between 0% (d=0): no successful decolonization,
and 100% (d=1): 100% of patients decolonized daily
return to susceptible status. Various combinations of
control strategies 1–3 can be considered to mimic
implementation of bundle measures in the hospital.
4. Vaccine coverage: fraction of admitted patients who
got vaccinated prior to admission to the hospital,
governed by the vaccine coverage model parameter
c. It can be varied between 0% (c=0) and 100% (c=1).
5. Vaccine efficacy against colonization: vaccine-
induced protection against carriage acquisition
(reduced risk of getting colonized once vaccinated),
governed by the vaccine efficacy model parameters
νCC = νCH). This can vary between 0% (same risk of
carriage acquisition in unvaccinated and vaccinated
patients, νCC = νCH = 0) and 100% (none of the
vaccinated patients become colonized, in the
hospital νCC = νCH = 1).
6. Vaccine efficacy against infection if colonized:
vaccine-induced protection against developing
MRSA infection in MRSA-colonized vaccinated
patients (reduced risk of developing MRSA infection
in MRSA vaccinated colonized patients), governed
by the vaccine efficacy model parameter νIC = νIH).
This can vary between 0% (vaccinated MRSA-
colonized patients develop MRSA infection at the
same rate as non-vaccinated MRSA-colonized
patients, νIC = νIH = 0) and 100% (no vaccinated
MRSA-colonized patients develop infection,
νIC = νIH = 1).
In this paper, we are primarily interested in model-based
projections of MRSA infection reduction in a hospital
setting following implementation of different hygiene
prevention measures and potential S. aureus vaccination
scenarios. This can be achieved by varying the values of the
six model parameters between 0% and 100% accordingly.
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Table 2 Mathematical representation of different control strategies and related parameters in the current
modelling framework
Unvaccinated Vaccinated
Colonization rate CA-MRSA (1 − η)FC, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 (1 − νCC)(1 − η)FC, 0 ≤ νCC ≤ 1
νCC: Vaccine efficacy against CA-MRSA colonization
η: Hygiene compliance parameter
FC = βCC(CC + CCV)/N + βIC(IC + ICV)/N




s: Screening efficacy parameter
Colonization rate HA-MRSA (1 − η)FH, 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 (1 − νCH)(1 − η)FH, 0 ≤ νCH ≤ 1
νCH: Vaccine efficacy against HA-MRSA colonization
FH = βCH(CH + CHV)/N + βIH(IH + IHV)/N








αC = dγCC, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1
d: Decolonization efficacy parameter




αH = dγCH, 0 ≤ d ≤ 1
Rate of progression to CA-MRSA infection after colonization φC (1 − νIC)φC, 0 ≤ νIC ≤ 1
νIC: Vaccine efficacy against CA-MRSA infection
Rate of progression to HA-MRSA infection after colonization φH (1 − νIH) φH, 0 ≤ νIH ≤ 1
νIH: Vaccine efficacy against HA-MRSA infection
Vaccination prior to hospital admission Fraction of vaccinated susceptible flowing into the hospital:
λSV¼c 1−λbaselineCC −λbaselineCH −λbaselineIC −λbaselineIH
 
Fraction of vaccinated colonized CA-MRSA flowing into the hospital
λCCV¼cλbaselineCC
Fraction of vaccinated colonized HA-MRSA flowing into the hospital:
λCHV¼cλbaselineCH
Fraction of vaccinated infected CA-MRSA flowing into the hospital:
λICV¼cλbaselineIC
Fraction of vaccinated infected HA-MRSA flowing into the hospital:
λIHV¼cλbaselineIH
Fraction of unvaccinated colonized CA-MRSA flowing into the hospital:
λCC¼ 1−cð ÞλbaselineCC
Fraction of unvaccinated colonized HA-MRSA flowing into the hospital:
λCH¼ 1−cð ÞλbaselineCH
Fraction of unvaccinated infected CA-MRSA flowing into the hospital:
λIC¼ 1−cð ÞλbaselineIC
Fraction of unvaccinated infected HA-MRSA flowing into the hospital:
λIH¼ 1−cð ÞλbaselineIH
c: Vaccine coverage parameter, 0 ≤ c ≤ 1
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A certain level of compliance with hygiene prevention
measures (% hand hygiene +/−% screening +/−%
decolonization) will presumably result in a consequent
projected reduction in the number of MRSA infections.
Upon potential implementation of vaccination, in addition
to hygiene prevention measures, a further reduction in the
rate of infection is conceivable. The projected magnitude
of this additional reduction will depend on the existing hy-
giene prevention measures, and compliance to them. An
intuitive argument could be made that if compliance with
hygiene prevention measures is sufficiently high, there
may be less potential for additional reduction of MRSA
infection via vaccination with a S. aureus vaccine; from
both a public health as well as a vaccine development
perspective, however, more evidence-based answers and
estimates are needed.
In-line with the primary purpose of this work, for all
the outcomes presented here, with the exception of the
six parameters described above, all the other model
parameters were kept fixed at the baseline values from
the original publications [23,24], which we employ here
at face value. These baseline parameter values, as
described in [23,24], are summarized here in Table 1 for
completeness and clarity. Although various other sensi-
tivity analyses could be carried out, in order to maintain
tractability, in the present analysis we chose to restrict
the scope and focus on the model parameters control-
ling the different interventions. Sensitivity analyses with
respect to other model input parameters are presented
in the original paper by D’Agata et al. [23], and more
technical and mathematical details are discussed in the
paper published by Webb et al. [24]. All our numerical
simulations are carried out in MATLAB R2010b The
MathWorks, Inc., Natick, Massachusetts, United States.
Results
All the results presented here are at steady-state, as tran-
sient regimes are short-lived i.e. a few months (see also
Figure 2 in [23]) and not of main interest for longer
term infection control policies in the hospital.
The key terms employed in this section are summa-
rized for clarity in Table 3.
The impact of hygiene prevention measures on MRSA in-
fection, as function of compliance, is illustrated in Figure 2.
All the percentage reductions in MRSA infection prevalence
shown in this figure were computed relative to a base case
corresponding to no hygiene prevention measures in place.
With 50% screening compliance and 50% efficacy of
decolonization, a model-projected reduction of 48% can be
achieved even at 0% hygiene compliance levels; this reduc-
tion can go up to 72% under similar conditions, assuming
100% hygiene compliance levels. At 100% screening compli-
ance and 50% efficacy of decolonization, a reduction of 64%
is projected by the model at 0% hygiene compliance level.
The maximum reduction projected by this model in a best
case scenario (100% screening compliance and 100% efficacy
of decolonization) is 76% (Figure 2).
Figure 3 illustrates the relative (%) additional reduction
in MRSA infection prevalence due to S. aureus vaccination,
as a function of the hygiene compliance levels, assuming
hygiene measures are in place, for a vaccine coverage fixed
at 25% (Figure 3, top panels) and 75% (Figure 3, bottom
panels) respectively. Each percentage reduction in MRSA
infection prevalence shown in this figure was computed
relative to a corresponding base case without vaccination.
Hence, the reductions reported in this figure reflect the
potential added impact of vaccination on top of other
existing preventative measures, for various case scenarios.
We would like to note here that due to the inherent
high-dimensional nature of this analysis, based on varying
six model parameters, there are many different possibil-
ities for visualizing and reporting the outcomes. The
figures shown here, while non-exhaustive, are intended to
reflect results in-line with the primary scope of this work.
As an illustrative example, consider for instance an aver-
age case scenario for preventative measures in place, with
50% decolonization efficacy, 50% screening compliance,
Figure 2 Illustration of model-projected impact of bundle measures only (no vaccination) on MRSA infection prevalence reduction. All
results shown here are at steady-state.
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and 50% hygiene compliance level. In such a case, for a
vaccination case scenario with 25% vaccine coverage and
75% vaccine efficacy against infection, the model-estimated
additional reduction in MRSA infection prevalence due to
vaccination is 12% (Figure 3 [top left]), assuming 0%
vaccine efficacy against colonization. Alternatively, for the
same average case, with vaccine coverage of 75%, and vac-
cine efficacy against infection of 75%, the model-estimated
additional reduction in MRSA infections due to vaccin-
ation is 37% (Figure 3 [bottom left]), assuming 0% vaccine
efficacy against colonization. Higher additional reductions
could be achieved if the vaccine had protective effects
against carriage acquisition as well (Figure 3 [top right]
and [bottom right]).
Figures 4 and 5 show the annual number of vaccine
doses in each of these case scenarios (right panels) and
the corresponding number of MRSA infections averted
(left panels) due to vaccination, assuming one vaccine
dose per patient. In our “average” preventative measure
case discussed above, for a vaccination case scenario
with 25% vaccine coverage and 75% vaccine efficacy
against infection, the model estimates that at 52 add-
itional cases of MRSA infection could be averted annu-
ally in a hospital setting with 6815 doses of vaccine
(Figure 4 [top]), assuming 0% vaccine efficacy against
colonization. Alternatively, with vaccine coverage of
75%, and vaccine efficacy against infection still at 75%,
the model estimates that 158 additional cases of MRSA
infection could be averted annually in a hospital setting
with 20680 doses of vaccine (Figure 5 [top]), assuming
0% vaccine efficacy against colonization. Additional ben-
efits that could be obtained if a potential vaccine had an
impact on colonization as well are illustrated in the cor-
responding plots in Figure 4 [bottom] and Figure 5 [bot-
tom], for a case scenario where a vaccine would have
50% efficacy against colonization.
Discussion
In this paper, we explore for the first time whether hypo-
thetical S. aureus vaccination in addition to other pre-
ventative measures may have the potential to further
reduce MRSA infection in a given hospital setting and we
attempt to provide estimates of the potential magnitude of
such reductions under various scenarios. To this end, we
employ a versatile dynamic transmission modelling frame-
work. Model-based projections indicate that even with im-
plementation of other hygiene prevention measures, S.
aureus vaccination could potentially provide additional
reduction of MRSA infection in a hospital setting. Vaccine
coverage and vaccine efficacy are key factors that would
impact the magnitude of this reduction. To our know-
ledge, this is the first study to assess potential of a S.
aureus vaccine to yield additional MRSA infection reduc-
tion in a hospital setting, on top of other preventative
measures that already proved efficient.
Model-based simulations illustrate how different levels
of reduction of MRSA infection can be achieved at the
hospital level with various combinations of interventions
such as hospital hygiene, decolonization and contact
precautions. These interventions have been shown to be
effective in decreasing the spread of MRSA in hospitals
[10-15,18], but their impact is variable, depending on
the level of compliance. Non-compliance with hand hy-
giene is recognized as the most important modifiable
Table 3 Definition of key terms employed throughout the analyses
Term Definition
Hygiene compliance level Hospital compliance with hand washing, wearing gloves, etc., varying between 0 (corresponding to hygiene
compliance parameter η = 0) and 1 (corresponding to hygiene compliance parameter η = 1).
Screening Identify the carriers and place them on contact precautions within the hospital. “x% screening” interpretation
here: hospital compliance to finding and placing carriers on contact precautions; varies between 0%
(corresponding to screening efficacy parameter s = 0): no MRSA carrier is placed on contact precaution and
100% (corresponding to screening efficacy parameter s = 1): all MRSA carriers are placed on the same contact
precautions as the MRSA-infected patients.
Decolonization Identify the carriers and apply decolonization regimens within the hospital. “x% decolonization” interpretation
here: actual efficacy of decolonization protocol, varying between 0% (corresponding to decolonization efficacy
parameter d = 0): no successful decolonization, and 100% (corresponding to decolonization efficacy parameter
d = 1): 100% of patients decolonized daily return to susceptible status.
Vaccine efficacy against
colonization
Vaccine-induced protection against carriage acquisition (reduced risk of colonization once vaccinated); can be
varied between 0% (corresponding to vaccine efficacy parameter νCC = νCH = 0) and 100% (corresponding to
vaccine efficacy parameter νCC = νCH = 1). Here we assumed for simplicity that νCC = νCH.
Vaccine efficacy against infection
if colonized
Vaccine-induced protection against developing actual MRSA infection in MRSA-colonized patients (lower risk of
developing MRSA infection in MRSA vaccinated colonized patients); can be varied between 0% (corresponding
to vaccine efficacy parameter νIC = νIH = 0) and 100% (corresponding to vaccine efficacy parameter νIC = νIH = 1).
Here we assumed for simplicity that νIC = νIH.
Vaccine coverage Fraction of admitted patients who got vaccinated prior to admission to the hospital. “x% vaccine coverage”
interpretation here: x% of the patients admitted daily into the hospital have been vaccinated prior to
admission; can be varied between 0% (corresponding to vaccine coverage parameter c = 0) and 100%
(corresponding to vaccine coverage parameter c = 1).
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cause of healthcare-acquired infections [32,33]. Despite
existing guidelines, rates of compliance with hand hy-
giene recommendations remain low in hospitals. The
Center for Disease Control and Prevention reported that
among HCW, the national average rate of compliance
with recommended hand hygiene procedures in the US
was approximately 40% in 2002 [32]. However, higher
compliance with hygiene recommendations is reported
in different hospital settings, reaching for instance 90%
in the Duke Hospital network in 2010 [34]. According to
a recent comprehensive review of literature published as
a Cochrane Review [35], the quality of intervention stud-
ies intended to evaluate and to improve hand hygiene
compliance remains low.
Figure 3 Illustration of simulated additional reduction in MRSA infection via vaccination on top of bundle measures. Model-projected
relative (%) reduction in MRSA infection prevalence due to vaccination on top of bundle measures for an average case scenario with 50%
decolonization and 50% screening. The top plots correspond to a 25% vaccine coverage scenario and the bottom plots to a 75% vaccine
coverage scenario. The plots on the left were generated assuming that a potential vaccine would have no impact on colonization, while the
corresponding plots on the right illustrate potential added benefits of a vaccine that would be 50% efficient at preventing colonization. All results
shown are at steady-state.
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Robicsek et al. [14] reported that the implementation of
universal MRSA surveillance (about 90%, screening) plus
decolonization and isolation in a 3-hospital network (with
about 850 beds) led to a 69.6% reduction in the number of
MRSA infections compared to baseline (prior to introduc-
tion of active surveillance) [14]. Using similar measures,
Jain and colleagues [18] reported a decrease of 62% in the
number of healthcare-associated MRSA infections in
ICUs belonging to Veterans Affairs hospitals. Our model
projections estimate reductions in MRSA infection preva-
lence of 60-75% under related conditions.
However, patient protection against MRSA infection
based on such interventions only is likely to be limited to
the hospitalization period and up to 30 days after hospital
discharge [14], while a vaccine may potentially provide
longer term protection (e.g. several months [36]). This is
an important aspect since patients who are more suscep-
tible to HA-MRSA and CA-MRSA hospital infections
[37-39] may also require repeated episodes of
hospitalization [40], which would presumably be reduced
through the implementation of MRSA preventative mea-
sures. Recently, Huang et al. [40] reported the results of a
retrospective cohort study evaluating the risk of MRSA in-
fection, hospitalization and death after hospital discharge
among high-risk patients who had been newly identified
as harbouring MRSA. Between January 1991 and Decem-
ber 2003, 591 new MRSA carriers were identified: 23%
colonized and 77% infected, at the time of detection. In
the year following the identification of the carrier state,
196 patients developed 317 MRSA infections. Of these
cases of MRSA infections, 26% involved bacteraemia and
17% led to MRSA-attributable death [40].
Here, we emphasize the fact that the model considered
in this paper is for MRSA only, focusing on the reduc-
tion in MRSA infection in a hospital setting, and does
not include MSSA. MSSA continues to represent a sub-
stantial proportion of all S. aureus infections in hospitals
[1], and future expansions of the model to include
MSSA should be considered if similar MSSA hospital
transmission data become available. One of the reasons
for building a vaccination component starting from an
existing versatile model [23] was the fact that baseline
values for the model parameters were coherently pro-
vided in a given hospital setting. Generally, model
parameters (such as transmission and progression rates)
need to be estimated by calibrating the model against
data. For such models to be useful in practice, the level
of model complexity needs to be supported by available
Figure 4 Model-based projections, 25% vaccine coverage: annual number of cases averted and corresponding number of doses. Left
panel: model-based projected reduction in the annual number of MRSA infections due to vaccination at 25% vaccine coverage on top of bundle
measures, as a function of the hygiene compliance level, for an average case scenario with 50% decolonization and 50% screening. Right panel:
annual number of vaccine doses necessary to achieve the corresponding levels of MRSA infection reduction, assuming one dose per patient. All
results are shown at steady-state. The slight variations in the number of doses here for the same level of vaccine coverage reflect the corresponding
differences in the number of daily admissions, which is allowed to vary in each instance to ensure full hospital occupancy at all times.
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data. Here, we did not have data available for MSSA in
this hospital setting. Also, following the original model
in [23,24], in this simplified modeling framework, dual
CA-MRSA/HA-MRSA colonization is not explicitly con-
sidered. Information/data about co-colonization with
CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA is currently largely missing,
as most studies tend to look at colonization separately.
Co-existence in this modeling framework is enabled via
adequate steady influxes of correspondingly colonized/
infected patients into the hospital. More discussions can
be found in [23,24].
We also emphasize that in practice, model-based pro-
jections may be setting/hospital-dependent, as the input
parameters for the underlying baseline model may vary
from one hospital setting to another. In this analysis, we
employed at face-value published baseline values [23,24]
for the model parameters governing infection transmis-
sion and spread in a given hospital setting. Such esti-
mates, which are key to any subsequent model outcome,
can be challenged and should ideally be obtained based
on model adaptation and calibration to specific hospital
settings. Rationale was provided and documented by
D’Agata et al., [23], and Webb et al., [24], and here we
simply accepted their framework as plausible in the
given hospital setting in US and used it as a starting
point for the type of analyses we were primarily inter-
ested in. To ascertain actual ranges and variability for
the different input parameters (e.g., inflow of colonized/
infected patients into the hospital, transmission/progres-
sion rates) so as to guide sensitivity analyses, further
studies are necessary to collect and collate data from dif-
ferent hospital settings reflecting inherent heterogene-
ities (e.g., different geographical location, different type
of hospital, patient population/community served).
As expected, assumed vaccine coverage has a significant
impact on the model outcomes. We varied the vaccine
coverage parameter between 0 and 100%, and we showed
here results corresponding to low (25%) and high (75%)
vaccine coverage, respectively, for illustrative purposes.
The actual levels of coverage attainable in practice are
likely to depend greatly on the type of vaccination strategy
(e.g., community vaccination, vaccination of planned
intervention patients) as well as hospital type (e.g., general
vs. specialty). A significant percentage of hospitalizations
in the US are due to interventions [41], most of which are
planned [42]. This percentage is typically higher in spe-
cialty hospitals [43].Vaccinating patients prior to hospital
admission may theoretically provide adequate time to
elicit a protective immune response [44]. In a recent Phase
IIB/III clinical trial, patients were vaccinated with a
Figure 5 Model-based projections, 75% vaccine coverage: annual number of cases averted and corresponding number of doses. Left
panel: model-based projected reduction in the annual number of MRSA infections due to vaccination at 75% vaccine coverage on top of bundle
measures, as a function of the hygiene compliance level for an average case scenario with 50% decolonization and 50% screening. Right panel:
annual number of vaccine doses necessary to achieve the corresponding levels of MRSA infection reduction, assuming one dose per patient. All
results are shown at steady-state. The slight variations in the number of doses here for the same level of vaccine coverage reflect the corresponding
differences in the number of daily admissions, which is allowed to vary in each instance to ensure full hospital occupancy at all times.
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S. aureus candidate vaccine 14–60 days before planned
cardiovascular surgery [45].
The work we present here was not intended as
exhaustive or definitive, but rather a starting point. Our
goals were to propose a versatile and tractable modelling
and simulation framework for evaluating the impact of
combined interventions on reducing MRSA infection at
the hospital level and illustrate it with concrete results
we found relevant in the context as a proof of concept.
The proposed framework can serve further for additional
analyses (e.g., cost-effectiveness) and model adaptations
(e.g., other preventative measures such as screening at
admission), as well as potential comparison with other
baseline models (e.g., different model parameters, simpli-
fied/other approaches, etc.).
Pending data availability, further expansions of this
type of modelling framework could be considered to in-
clude a dynamic exchange and double feedback between
the community and the hospital setting.
Finally, we want to acknowledge that the mechanistic
deterministic modelling approach we employed here,
while appealing because of its built-in tractability, is lim-
ited in the sense that everything is assumed as an average
at a patient population/hospital level, with no explicit
account for various sources of heterogeneity, variability
and uncertainty. Particularly in smaller size hospitals, such
an approach may not be ideally-suited, and alternatives
such as stochastic and/or individual-based models could
be considered.
Conclusions
We have shown here how adequate S. aureus vaccination,
prior to hospital admission, has the potential to further
reduce burden of MRSA infection in the hospital setting,
with magnitude of additional reduction varying depending
on the level of other hygiene prevention measures in
place. Current prevention measures such as hand hygiene
are effective at reducing MRSA infection, but compliance
with these measures is critical. Therefore, it is important
that these practices continue to be promoted and imple-
mented by hospitals and healthcare workers.
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